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Chapter 7. Introduction to Information Security
Information security affects the reliability, confidentiality, and integrity of com­
puterized and noncomputerized information and business transactions. Without 
effective security, clients would not have reasonable assurance that the informa­
tion they use to make business decisions is valid and reliable, or that the 
operation of their key business systems can be quickly resumed in the event of 
an interruption.
The practicing certified public accountant (CPA) should have a better 
understanding of information security implications in the following four areas.
1. Audit implications — What impact can effective security or security weak­
nesses have on the audit of a client that uses computers in the 
accounting process?
2. Opportunities for Management Advisory Services (MAS) — How can the prac­
titioner provide assistance to clients in meeting their information 
security needs?
3. Use of technology in delivering client service — What are the information 
security considerations (such as protection of client confidentiality) 
associated with the increased use of technology (such as personal com­
puters, electronic mail) to assist in providing client services?
4. General awareness — What does the practitioner need to know to be con­
versant with his or her clients on the subject of information security?
The remainder of this introduction provides a definition and description of 
information security and discusses each of the implications for the practitioner in 
greater detail. Subsequent sections address various functional areas of informa­
tion security.
Definition and Information security includes the policies, procedures, and methods for assuring
Need for that —
Information Security ■ Access to information systems resources (for example, data, software, 
hardware, and networks) is restricted to only authorized individuals 
(access security).
■ Information systems resources are available on an ongoing basis to sup­
port the needs of the organization (system availability).
Access security policies, procedures, and methods include restricting access 
by unauthorized people, but exclude controls over what authorized people may 
do with their access. For example, access security is designed to ensure that only 
authorized individuals can access the accounts payable system in order to input 
payment transactions, but does not address whether the individual only inputs 
authorized payment transactions after access is obtained.
System availability policies, procedures, and methods are directed toward 
minimizing the impact of unpredictable events caused by nature or people. The 
policies, procedures, and methods include assuring availability in the event of an 
environmental hazard (such as fire, earthquake, flood) or as a result of some per­
sonal action (such as a computer virus, an error in system software maintenance,
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an intentional disruption). They generally would exclude loss of system availabil­
ity due to conditions under the control of management (such as lack of 
appropriate capacity planning or failure to perform reasonable hardware preven­
tive maintenance). System availability also includes consideration of measures to 
prevent or minimize adverse results (such as fire extinguishers and uninterrupt­
ible power supplies) and the measures to recover in the event of an adverse result 
(such as disaster recovery action plan and procedures, hot site as a backup facil­
ity, alternative network arrangements).
Information security can be viewed as addressing the following four types 
of threats:
1. Disclosure of confidential information to unauthorized people
2. Unauthorized modification of information (meaning, data, programs, 
processing results)
3. Disruption of information systems resource availability
4. Misuse of information systems resources by both authorized and unau­
thorized users
These threats can exist individually or in various combinations. In analyzing 
and discussing security threats and controls, it is helpful to subdivide informa­
tion security into functional areas. Each of the following will be described in 
greater detail.
■ Application security relates to the development, maintenance, operation, 
and use of applications.
■ Database security relates to the use of databases and/or sharing of data 
between users.
■ Systems software security relates to operating systems, access control soft­
ware, and other systems software.
■ Network security relates to telecommunications and networks.
■ Physical security relates to protecting resources against physical access and 
environmental hazards.
■ Security management relates to the planning and management of an effec­
tive security program.
Audit Implications of 
Information Security
As a client’s accounting system makes more extensive and complex use of com­
puters, the auditor increasingly needs to consider the role of information systems 
and security in obtaining an understanding of the client’s control structure and 
assessing control risk below the maximum. There are a number of audit implica­
tions of information security and the client’s control structure. In understanding 
the control environment, the auditor may need to consider the overall approach 
taken by senior management to assure that newly implemented information sys­
tems are well controlled and secure.
Transactions may be entered into a computer system on-line or initiated by 
a computer system. In these instances, the auditor may need to consider the role 
that information security plays in assuring that transactions are from an autho­
rized user.
In some client computer systems, the movement and accountability for 
assets are controlled by the system. In this case, the auditor may need to consider 
the effectiveness of the impact of the client’s information systems and informa-
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tion security in providing assurance that assets and the related accounting 
records are adequately protected from unauthorized access as a step to being 
able to assess control risk below the maximum.
Information security often plays a key role in assuring that computer sys­
tems are developed and maintained only as intended by management and that 
such systems are protected from unauthorized modification. This may be particu­
larly significant to the auditor if such systems are used to perform key accounting 
controls, functions, or calculations.
Many companies are moving toward the use of electronic data interchange 
(EDI) to replace the traditional exchange of paper documents for purchasing, 
shipping, receiving, invoicing, and payment. If the auditor needs to rely on elec­
tronic evidence for substantive testing purposes, he or she may need to consider 
the effectiveness of access security in assessing the competency of such evidence 
for audit purposes.
The preceding examples illustrate the increasing role of information secu­
rity in financial and accounting systems and the corresponding increasing need 
for auditors to be able to understand and, in some cases, evaluate the effective­
ness of security over such systems.
Opportunities for 
Management 
Advisory Services
Information security offers consultants a wide-ranging field of opportunity. A 
number of consultants are staffed with specialists who were formerly with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Often, 
these firms successfully deliver security services to clients by integrating account­
ing and investigative services.
Those services make up a long list, which grows as the practitioner finds 
new avenues for providing client services. MAS may be needed to assess the 
adequacy of a client’s information security plan and its components. The senior 
management of a client firm may be interested in testing the emergency pre­
paredness plan; an attempt to penetrate the system may be requested. As a client 
organization considers a new information system, management may need an 
objective review of the system’s security. Generally, the most cost-effective engage­
ment is a risk assessment of all information systems.
Consultants may also be called upon for assistance in the technical aspects 
of security. The security issues concerning operating systems, or an unusual or 
unique application, may require the services of a consultant.
As client firms begin to understand the magnitude of the problem, they will 
begin to seek assistance in designing and implementing information security 
plans. These plans will range from the strategic overview plan to the detailed dis­
aster recovery plan. Training will be needed. Periodic reviews and updates of the 
security plan will be necessary.
Because of the nature of practice units, this report concentrates on auditing 
and consulting; but the issues of information security affect tax services or any 
other services that the practitioner offers. Productivity is critical. Therefore, com­
puterization and automation are central to the delivery of all services. The 
practitioner must be constantly alert to cost-effective and secure methods of 
increasing productivity for client services.
Use of Technology in Service Delivery
Security implications related to the use of technology in the delivery of client 
services (meaning, audit, tax, consulting, and office automation) include 
the following:
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■ Use of microcomputers — If the practitioner uses microcomputers or other 
computing equipment in providing services to clients (such as for 
spreadsheets, reports, and tax return preparation), the electronic ver­
sions of these documents need to be protected by appropriate security 
measures to assure that client confidentiality is maintained and that 
such information is not inadvertently destroyed.
■ Use of other technology — The practitioner needs to consider similar secu­
rity issues when using technologies such as fax, electronic mail, and 
voice mail, in providing services to clients.
Obviously, security can have an impact on a client’s business in many ways. 
Knowledgeable practitioners who can discuss these issues with their clients will 
clearly be appreciated as business moves toward the increased use of complex 
computer systems. This aspect of technology is discussed further in Chapter 8, 
“Implications for the Practitioner. ”
The chapters that follow provide additional background information on the 
functional areas of information security.
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Chapter 2. Overview of Application
Security Issues
Background 
and Issues
Practitioners are often asked to evaluate or review the adequacy of security for 
a computer installation. This chapter includes background information and a 
description of the key issues pertaining to application security, a major compo­
nent of security and access control that is designed into application programs 
or systems.
Although security should be addressed during the design of systems, the 
failure to do so may be attributable to time constraints and a general lack of under­
standing of the issues on the part of both practitioners and designers. Systems 
placed into production with inadequate security controls may be vulnerable.
A number of people, for example, consider access control packages (such as 
IBM’s RACF or Computer Associates’ CA-ACF2) a panacea for security. However, 
access control packages do not, in and of themselves, adequately address applica­
tion security issues. For instance, it is sometimes difficult for an access control 
package to restrict individuals to certain functions (for example, add, delete, or 
change) or certain sensitive information (such as salary) available within an on­
line program. In addition, as microcomputers are brought into the process, these 
products may not provide sufficient controls by themselves.
Use and Limitation 
of Access
Control Software
General-purpose access control packages do not necessarily adequately address 
application security requirements. Access control packages are often used to pro­
tect the system environment that limits users’ access to program libraries, data 
sets or files, and on-line transaction programs. However, access control software is 
not always designed and/or may not be appropriately set up to limit and control 
access to features available within an application system (for example, accounts 
payable and general ledger). In many cases, once a user is provided with access to 
an on-line transaction program within an application system, the user may be 
able to access any functions or data available to the on-line program.
For example, consider an application that is used to maintain payroll and 
personnel information for multiple companies. This application comprises many 
on-line transaction programs that are used to add, maintain, and display informa­
tion. Suppose a user is provided with access to a transaction menu or program 
that can display and modify human resource information. He or she may be able 
to display and modify all information available to the application program, unless 
special application security routines are built into the program, or the access con­
trol software is interfaced with the on-line system to restrict such access. This 
means the user may be able to access employee information for multiple compa­
nies, display salary amounts, and display and modify any of the information.
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Application 
Security Features 
and Functions
Security should be addressed during the design phase of systems development. It 
is the responsibility of both the user and the information systems analyst to 
review the design of security features to ensure that they are properly considered. 
Internal and external auditors may also be requested to evaluate security and 
should understand the issues. Adding a control to an existing application is esti­
mated to be five times more expensive than developing an application that 
includes a control in its design. The following sections summarize features that 
are often included in application systems.
Security Over Sensitive Information
It is desirable to limit the access of sensitive information to certain authorized 
individuals. This can be accomplished by including special routines in on-line 
transaction programs that determine if an individual is authorized to access the 
sensitive information and either displays or does not display the sensitive infor­
mation, based on the access authority of the user.
Another alternative is to design two separate on-line programs that display 
information. One of the programs displays the sensitive information; the other 
program does not. Individuals that need access to the sensitive information 
would be provided with access to that program.
Security to Limit User Access to Data
Application security is also needed to limit user access to certain records in a file. 
For example, consider a system that provides the capability to record accounting 
transactions for multiple companies. It may be desirable to restrict access to the 
company individuals work for or to their primary area of responsibility. These 
kinds of controls can be effected with access control packages, but are often 
more easily put in place with separate programs, as discussed previously. Since 
data from multiple companies are stored in the same physical file, application 
security routines would need to be developed to limit the access of individuals to 
certain records.
Security Over Functions Within a Program
A number of on-line transaction programs are designed to perform multiple 
functions (for example, inquiry, add, delete, modify). The programs are 
designed this way to make the system easier to use and to reduce the number of 
programs and lines of code in the system. Application security routines are 
needed to control access and use of the functions.
Menu Security
Menus make an application easier to use by providing a list of functions that are 
available to the user. Security is often designed into menu systems by restricting 
the user to certain functions and by displaying on the menu only those items to 
which the user has authorized access. In other cases, all options are displayed, 
but certain options cannot be executed without the password.
Audit Trail
Standard system software often provides for facilities to record both the use of 
on-line transactions and access to production files. However, logging every access 
to data can have a significant negative impact on system performance. Often, it is
6
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more desirable to build the logging of users or sensitive transactions through 
application security routines rather than through system software. Of course, too 
much logging results in transaction reports that are too voluminous to review.
Special Security Features
There are many other routines that can be designed into application software to 
improve security. For instance, many companies have started to include elec­
tronic approval procedures in software. Electronic approval requires one 
individual to enter the transaction and another individual to approve the trans­
action. Transactions will not be processed until they have been approved by the 
reviewer’s ID.
Other security routines have been designed into the programs used for 
automated teller machines (ATMs). Many ATMs have been programmed to keep 
and not return ATM cards that have been reported as stolen.
7
Chapter 3. Overview of Database
Security Issues
Background and 
Terminology
Use of databases for financial accounting applications is growing significantly. At 
first, databases were used exclusively by extremely large and complex organiza­
tions. However, their effectiveness in smaller organizations is now widely accepted. 
The increasing popularity of database systems has resulted in the development of 
database management systems (DBMS), which can operate on any computer 
hardware, including minicomputers and microcomputers. As a consequence, 
many companies may use some form of a database system. These systems pose 
security and control issues, as well as service opportunities for the practitioner.
In a database environment, data are shared among many users and many 
applications. Although inadequate controls over the database can result in fraud­
ulent access to data, another possible consequence may be day-to-day errors that 
are difficult to detect and more expensive to correct than fraud because they can 
affect multiple applications. Practitioners should not be intimidated by 
databases. However, they should recognize that the use of a database introduces 
different kinds of control concerns and that technical assistance or additional 
research may be necessary. Control concerns include procedures over restricting 
access and coordinating database activity and the concentration of risk.
A database is a collection of related data that are stored together without 
unnecessary redundancy and that serve multiple applications. The data are 
stored independently of the programs, which use the data. A database is imple­
mented using a DBMS, which provides centralized, controlled access to the 
physical database and insulates application programs from the particulars of 
physical data storage. In this way, program independence and elimination of data 
redundancy can be reasonably achieved. Application programs request access to 
particular data elements (fields) by issuing a call to the DBMS. Upon receiving 
the application program’s request, the DBMS locates the necessary data in the 
database and handles any input/output operations required to make the 
requested data available to the application program. Thus, the DBMS provides 
the means by which application programs can be written independently of the 
physical data structure.
In addition to the terminology introduced previously, the physical structure 
(sometimes called the physical view) of the database is described to the DBMS 
using that system’s data definition language (DDL). The DDL is also used to 
describe the relationship between the physical structure of the database and the 
various logical views of the data. The logical view is the position of the data as 
viewed by the program or a user of the program. Generally, the logical view of 
the database as a whole is referred to as a schema. Each application program will 
then have its own logical view of only the data to which it requires access. This 
view, which is a subset of the schema, is referred to as a subschema and is defined 
to the DBMS using the DDL.
A second software package that may be used to assist in the implementation 
of a database is the database dictionary/directory system (DD/DS). Careful defi­
nition of individual fields, called data elements, is critical in a database 
environment. These definitions can be documented in the data dictionary and 
generally include the name, description, characteristics, and format of data ele­
ments, as well as how they are stored and the programs that use them.
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Database
Administrator
The database administrator (DBA) is the manager of the database. In large orga­
nizations, the database administration department may be an independent group 
staffed by a number of individuals; however, in smaller organizations the function 
may be performed on a part-time basis by a systems programmer or by computer 
operations personnel. One responsibility of the DBA is security and information 
classification. The DBA is also responsible for the database design, definition, 
and maintenance. Other functions include setting policies and procedures for 
backup and recovery, determining appropriate access permissions for application 
programs and users, and resolving any conflicts among users of the data.
The database administration function should be appropriately segregated 
from other functions. Database administration personnel should not have appli­
cation programming responsibilities. Such responsibilities, combined with 
knowledge of the data, provide an opportunity to commit and cover up errors 
and irregularities. In controlling the availability of data, the DBA becomes a traf­
fic cop and permits users access to data based upon rules and regulations 
previously established by user management. The DBA uses the DBMS to create 
and maintain the schema and the subset views of the data (the subschemas'). 
Because data are shared by multiple applications, program development and 
maintenance activity should involve the database administration department.
Database Models Database models define the methodology used in data storage to connect logical 
data elements together to form the logical views of the data. Although a number 
of different DBMSs are available, each uses one of three basic database architec­
tures: hierarchical, network, and relational. From a practitioner’s perspective, the 
approach to an audit engagement is not significantly affected by which database 
model is used. Nevertheless, it is necessary and beneficial to have a general 
understanding of the components of each architecture in order to communicate 
with the DBA and to grasp the key points of discussion in current database litera­
ture. A knowledge of the structures also helps the practitioner determine the 
most effective and economical way to retrieve data from the database.
Hierarchical Database
The hierarchical model has been the most popular structure in the large systems 
implementation field for many years. The logical view of hierarchical databases 
resembles an inverted tree, which is why they are referred to as tree structures. 
Units of data are dependent and logically arranged in multilevel structures con­
sisting of one root segment and any number of segment (record) types at each 
subordinate level. Each unit has a single owner called the parent segment, but it 
may own other units of data called the children.
Two key differences between a hierarchical database and other database 
models are: (1) the use of a link rather than a key, and (2) the one-to-many rela­
tionship among data elements represented in this model. The most popular 
hierarchical DBMS being used today is IBM’s Information Management System 
(IMS). Depending upon the version of IMS being used, the options available 
include terminal security, password security, sign-on verification, and transaction 
and application program security.
Network Database
A network database is similar to the hierarchical database model, except that in a 
network database, a child may have more than one parent. The network model is
9
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made up of elements called records that consist of a collection of one or more 
types of data items. Each individual record is referred to as a record occurrence. 
This model utilizes the concepts of sets. A set represents a relationship between 
two different kinds of records; one is the owner and the other is a member of the 
set. Each set occurrence consists of one occurrence of its owner record and any 
number of occurrences of its member record.
One example of network DBMS being used today is Computer Associate’s 
Integrated Database Management System (IDMS). IDMS security options include 
privacy locks and keys to restrict the functions that users of a specific schema can 
perform on the data being accessed. Access can also be restricted at various 
levels. In addition, by using the related data dictionary system available, controls 
can be designed to compare the application program compilation date to the 
date any schema/subschema it accesses was defined. Additional controls can be 
implemented through passwords, special keys, and data range analysis.
Relational Database
In the relational model, data are structured in two-dimensional tables and 
related by their value, not by pointers. All data are presented in tabular form. 
Two dimensional relationships exist between (1) the key field and (2) any or all 
fields in this table or in any other table having the same key field. This model is a 
good example of limited, controlled redundancy. In a relational database, any 
relationship can be represented by a table dedicated to that purpose. A widely 
used relational DBMS being used today on the mainframe is IBM’s DB2 product. 
In the DB2 database, security is enforced by primarily two methods. The first 
entails data definition facilities and defining views that contain only the data 
a particular application is allowed to address. Users can be further restricted by 
not letting them access individual values but just letting them view totals and 
averages. The second method is a grant/revoke facility that prevents users from 
performing operations on tables or views. Through a layered approach, DB2 also 
provides the facility to distribute control of various functions to different parts of 
the organization. Most microcomputer database software uses relational architec­
ture and concepts.
Security Issues Sharing data across application lines raises concerns over restriction of access to 
data. In a nondatabase environment, each application has its own physically sepa­
rate data files, and restricting access to each file is easier. In a database 
environment, data for all applications are stored together, and restricting access 
is more complex. There is concern that only authorized users or programs can 
access the data elements and that such users/programs are allowed access only to 
data that they need, are authorized to use, and are appropriately limited to either 
read, update, insert, or delete data.
Another issue arises if two or more concurrently executing functions 
require access to the same data element. The concern is that both functions 
receive consistent information and that no loss of data occurs, especially if either 
or both update the data element.
A final issue of restriction of access, though not unique to databases, is the 
impact of an error. The use of data introduced through error may result in the 
erroneous updating of other portions of the database. Inadvertently, the integrity 
of the database may suffer further compromise over time because the erroneous 
data continue to be used to update other records and data elements in the 
database. In addition, erroneous data that are shared may cause problems in 
multiple applications.
10
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In coordinating database activities, data ownership should be carefully 
established and documented. The level of control over individual data elements 
should be consistent with the needs of the most sensitive user. Also, the various 
users of each data element must agree to a common definition of that data ele­
ment. Because multiple users will be accessing the same data, the use of the 
database needs to be appropriately planned and coordinated.
The database environment includes a concentration of risk, a characteristic 
that results from sharing data among multiple applications and reducing or elim­
inating the occurrence of redundant data elements. Given the amount of data 
stored in a database, the practitioner who is focused on client service must be 
concerned about the adequacy of the physical safeguards and backup that are in 
place. Such concerns about recovery and backup are compounded by the tech­
nological complexity of the database environment and by the fact that multiple 
applications use the database. Administratively, centralizing the data manage­
ment function may result in a reduced segregation of duties.
Control Measures In order to address the issues described above, the practitioner should look for 
the following controls in the client’s information systems:
■ Schema and subschema definitions should be centralized with the DBA.
■ Access to schema and subschema documentation should be restricted.
■ Privacy locks and keys to active, sensitive data elements can be included 
in the subschema definitions.
■ Compliance with such controls can be enforced with the data diction­
ary system.
■ The system development life cycle (SDLC) should provide for DBA 
approval at key points in the development and maintenance of applications.
■ The function of the DBA should be clearly defined and understood by 
everyone. The DBA can then serve as an independent arbiter among 
users of the database.
■ The DD/DS should be used to document the contents of the database. 
It can help to ensure that standards are being followed and documenta­
tion standards are being adhered to.
■ The database should be backed up regularly.
■ The DBMS should maintain log files which contain before and after 
images for each transaction updating the database.
■ These files should not be on the same physical device as the database itself.
■ The database administration function should be segregated from opera­
tions and programmers.
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Software Security
Background The operating system, an important part of any mainframe, minicomputer, or 
microcomputer system, is a group of programs written by the hardware manufac­
turer or written for the hardware manufacturer by another vendor. An example 
of a mainframe operating system is IBM’s Multiple Virtual Storage/Extended 
Architecture (MVS/XA). An example of a microcomputer operating system is 
Microsoft’s Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS), which was written by the 
Microsoft Corporation for the IBM personal computers but is also used for IBM- 
compatible microcomputers. Operating systems execute various functions that 
include the following:
■ Scheduling a job
■ Initiating a job
■ Terminating a job
■ Reading a data file
■ Writing a data file
■ Communicating with input and output devices
■ Controlling the input and output devices
■ Logging the system activities
■ Allocating the system resources
Security Issues The powerful and encompassing functions performed by the operating system 
make its software and utilities (prewritten codes that the operating systems can 
access) as important as application software. Security is extremely important; 
both systems and utilities should be protected against destruction and uninten­
tional modification. An example of the dangers to the system is the use of 
computer programs copied from an outside source. Copied code may contain a 
virus that will make unauthorized and malicious changes and/or destroy operat­
ing system software, application software, data files, or databases.
Some mainframe operating systems can be modified by the user. MVS/XA 
allows this by permitting modifications at places called user exits. If the user makes 
errors at these user exits, the original operating system is still intact. The modifica­
tions at the user exits can be backed out and the operating system maintains 
integrity. Modifications to mainframe operating systems are made by systems pro­
grammers. Although modifications to mainframe operating systems are normal (yet 
controlled), modifications to microcomputer operating systems are not normal.
The utilities of an operating system perform functions such as copying data 
or deleting data, which occur on a daily basis. An example of a microcomputer 
utility that copies data is the COPY command in MS-DOS. A mainframe utility 
program that deletes data sets or files is IBM’s IEFBR14. An example of a main­
frame utility that deletes individual fields in a file or data set is IBM’s AMASPZAP, 
more commonly known as SUPER ZAP.
12
Overview of Systems Software Security
A microcomputer utility that deletes files or data sets is the DELETE (DEL) 
command in MS-DOS. If a user deletes a file or data set, the file or data set is not 
actually deleted. It is marked for deletion, that is, a mark is made on the direc­
tory. When the user requests a directory listing on the microcomputer (DIR) or a 
volume table of contents listing (VTOC) on the mainframe, the file or data set 
marked for deletion does not appear. However, the file actually still exists and will 
continue to exist until the disk or disk pack is reorganized or the part of the disk 
is written over. To restore the data, the user must use a utility that restores the file 
before the reorganization or overwrite occurs.
An example of mainframe software that restores deleted files from a backup 
copy is Innovation Data Procession’s Fast Dump Restore. An example of micro­
computer software that restores deleted files is Quick Unerase in the Norton 
Utilities.
Examples of mainframe software that protects operating system software, 
utilities, and applications software against intentional or unintentional destruc­
tion and against unintentional modification are the access control software 
packages from Computer Associates’ ACF2 (Access Control Facility) and IBM’s 
RACF (Resource Access Control Facility).
Operating systems software, utilities, and applications software should be 
backed up to allow prompt recovery from a system failure. Copies should be 
placed in an off-site fireproof vault. New backup copies should be made when­
ever a change has occurred.
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chapter 5. Overview of Network Security Issues
Summary of Issues 
and Background
The proliferation of area networks is significant, a trend that poses control issues 
as well as service opportunities for the general practitioner. The security issues 
for networks are similar to those addressed in the mainframe environment, that 
is, protection of data from loss or inadvertent damage; lack of confidentiality; 
fraud; malicious tampering; and physical damage or theft. Nevertheless, main­
frame and minicomputer security protocols and methodology are relatively well 
established. In a network environment, protocols and methodology are less well 
defined and pose real concerns for the auditor. Network security issues involve 
the physical security of the network and the network server, information security, 
and communications security, as well as the data controls and policies and proce­
dures that are in place to protect the network.
Personal computers have spread rapidly and widely throughout organiza­
tions. Various kinds of microcomputers are routinely used for word processing, 
financial analysis, sales reporting, order processing, and many other business 
functions. As the use of microcomputers has grown, so has a need for these per­
sonal computers to communicate, both with each other and with the larger, 
centralized information systems facilities of the organization.
Personal computers may be used for local stand-alone applications, but this 
approach to processing cannot fill the additional needs that typically arise. For 
example, workstations may have the following requirements: to access data that is 
stored in another area, to allow users to communicate electronically, and to allow 
a group of computers to share devices that are too expensive for use by only one 
person. Local area networks (LANs) fulfill these requirements by connecting 
microcomputers together. Microcomputers, workstations, and peripherals are 
thus permitted to communicate with each other directly, without passing all sig­
nals through a central mainframe or minicomputer server.
The interchange of electronic information between multiple sites and appli­
cations opens up a different set of problems concerning the maintenance of data 
integrity and security. In the classical data center scenario, data integrity can be 
maintained by the information systems staff. System maintenance, backup proce­
dures, monthly financial closings, etc., are all under the control of a central 
group. In such systems, users enter data into databases through extremely well- 
defined channels; programs and input screens have extensive error-checking and 
data-validation techniques. Audit trails are easy to maintain and the reconstruc­
tion of data files after system or program failures is tedious but mostly a matter of 
following well-defined routines.
Microcomputer and networks used together have drastically undermined 
this methodology. Information systems groups find themselves losing control 
over the flow of information. It is no longer possible to keep all sensitive data on 
the mainframe, however much that might be the preference of a number of peo­
ple. The convenience of semiautonomous workstations, like that of personal 
computers, overwhelmingly guarantees their proliferation. Computing is no 
longer exclusively in the hands of information systems professionals; it is being 
taken on by everyone.
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Security Issues As the use of microcomputers has grown, so has a need for these personal com­
puters to share devices, communicate with each other, and access data that are 
stored in some other area such as another microcomputer, server, or host. 
Technologies such as LANs, metropolitan area networks (MANs), and wide area 
networks (WANs) have been developed to meet these requirements. Often, per­
sonal computers in the workplace are tied to networks yet bypass existing 
corporate security protocols. The following sections address aspects of network 
security and controls.
Network Security
As in the case of traditional data centers, there are three key areas for the prac­
titioner to consider in reviewing network security, and they are described 
as follows.
Physical Security. This addresses protection against the theft of hardware and 
data, as well as protection against defective power or static electricity. Control 
measures include controlled/guarded access to work areas, locks on office doors, 
identification on hardware, the physical locking up of equipment, vaults for stor­
age, and, for very sensitive applications, key cards.
Data Security. Items of concern relate to the risk of disclosure, unauthorized 
or undetected modification, and the unavailability of information when needed. 
Controls involve physical and logical access to the workstations and file server. 
These include passwords and methods of authentication, access to systems (appli­
cations, files and records), as well as system services (printing, server 
management, queues, etc.). Other measures may include encryption and decryp­
tion techniques, disk maintenance and housekeeping, local and off-site backups, 
report distribution, the destruction of hard copies of extra printouts, and the 
deletion of files that are no longer required.
Communications Security. Networks provide the means to communicate elec­
tronically — both inside and outside the organization — with other networks, 
hosts, public databases, or public networks (Tymnet, Telenet, etc.). Networks are 
vulnerable internally, as well as externally. Security relates to devices entirely out­
side the network that are able to gain access by dialing into the network, to one 
of its devices or to a multiuser network, or by tampering with the network com­
munications carrier. The potential for eavesdropping or electrical interference 
on the communications lines is probably less significant than the risk associated 
with direct access to devices on the network.
Control Measures
Control measures to help secure a network from unauthorized access include the 
following: callback units, filter systems (small computers between a host and 
caller which demand a certain series of touchtones before access is granted), 
encryption programs, or various identification devices and circuits.
In addition, there are some unique security issues related to the network 
environment. Such issues include the following.
Operating System Security. Mainframe and minicomputer vendors such as 
IBM, DEC, and HP have well-established security protocols provided by the oper­
ating system. This allows information systems professionals to precisely structure 
access. Networks running under microcomputer operating systems such as MS- 
DOS or IBM’s OS/2 do not have any sophisticated security features provided by 
the operating system. MS-DOS is a real-time mode system that gives programs
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access to everything in the system. LAN owners, therefore, can only secure their 
systems to the extent of the security measures provided by the LAN vendor or 
other third-party vendors.
Host Access. Increasingly, users are demanding access to corporate 
databases. Security issues arise when users are given the rights to download data 
from mainframes or servers, as well as access rights to such data on the network. 
A very difficult issue is whether or not microcomputer users should have the abil­
ity to directly update the mainframe data hies without incorporating verification, 
error-checking, and validation algorithms. Security may be severely compromised 
because little control can be exercised over what a user does with data that have 
been downloaded to a microcomputer. The problem may be compounded if data 
that have been altered can then be uploaded to the mainframe without sufficient 
controls.
Access Control. The need for access and data controls is just as critical for 
microcomputer-produced data and downloaded data as for mainframe-produced 
data. Application controls such as hash totals, run-to-run totals, and record 
counts should be implemented. Passwords to applications and system services 
should also be implemented to enhance controls over data access (data access 
is allowed only to authorized individuals) and privacy of data (access to data 
is given only to authorized individuals who need to know in order to perform 
their function).
Procedures. For effective security and control of server data, procedures simi­
lar to those established for the mainframe environment should be in place. 
Procedures should assist in ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the data 
being processed by the network. These procedures should include adequate doc­
umentation, proper program development procedures, timely backup, training, 
disaster recovery, file retention standards, and audit involvement.
Electronic Data Interchange. Electronic data interchange (EDI) systems facili­
tate the transfer of business documents, such as purchase orders and invoices, 
between the computers of two organizations. Currently, documents are trans­
ferred electronically from one personal computer to the next through a direct 
connection or through a public data network referred to as a value-added network 
(VAN). EDI is becoming more critical to a number of industries, especially retail, 
transportation, health care, and others. As organizations continue to make use of 
EDI, network security issues need to be considered along with other issues related 
to EDI not discussed here. The network security issues related to EDI include con­
trols over transmission of data, security over systems software, and others.
Absolute security is unattainable on a working network. Various levels of 
security are commercially available. When considering various approaches, con­
sideration should be given to how much security is needed and the level and type 
of risk an organization can handle. If risk is mainly from outsiders, then encryp­
tion and physical and data access controls may be important; if risk is from 
insiders, then access controls and audit trails can be powerful.
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Other Security Issues
Background and 
Issues
News reports of viruses, hackers, and computer fraud are increasing. Each repre­
sents a threat to an organization’s information systems, and indicates the 
importance of a comprehensive security program to protect an organization’s 
information systems and its data. This section discusses three topics in this area: 
physical security (direct access), logical security (logical access), and backup/ 
disaster recovery procedures.
There are important issues and service opportunities for practitioners in 
each of these areas. Data are one of the most important assets of most business 
entities. Clients may need assistance in ensuring the integrity and safety of that 
asset. Specifically, policies and procedures are needed to (1) protect the physical 
existence of an organization’s data, (2) prevent unauthorized access to that data, 
and (3) address possible natural or man-made disasters. Practitioners can assist 
their clients in all three areas.
Both the physical components of an information system (computers, disk 
drives, tapes, monitors, printers, etc.) and the data are valuable assets. Physical 
security addresses direct threats to both the physical components and the data by 
means of theft or sabotage. Logical security addresses threats involving unautho­
rized access, disclosure, use, destruction, or alteration of the data. Backup/ 
disaster recovery addresses environmental threats to an organization’s data 
resources such as fires, floods, and hurricanes.
Physical Security The major issue of physical security is controlling, limiting, and restricting direct 
access to the facilities to only authorized personnel. The possibilities range from 
simple to highly sophisticated procedures. Elementary precautions involve such 
matters as locking the doors of rooms with terminals or larger computers; lock­
ing hard drives on personal computers; and chaining PCs, terminals, printers, 
and other peripherals to the desk or workstation.
The locking mechanism itself, however, can be augmented by technology. 
Several kinds of locks or similar devices exist. Smart cards may be used instead of 
traditional keys. Such cards store information about the user and his or her 
degree of authorization to access the information system. That information can 
be stored either on a magnetic strip on the back of the card (as with credit cards) 
or the card may even contain a small microprocessor chip. The card is inserted 
into a card reader attached to a microcomputer or workstation. If the informa­
tion is stored on a magnetic strip, the reader sends its information to the central 
computer to verify the user’s identity and access privileges. If the card contains 
a microprocessor, the central computer then sends a code to the card and 
the card’s microprocessor runs that code through a program and generates a 
response code, which is sent back to the central computer to verify authoriza­
tion levels.
Smart cards and traditional keys and locks share a common weakness; there 
is no way to verify that the person to whom that card was issued is the person 
using the card. Lost or stolen cards that wind up in the wrong hands permit 
access to the unauthorized persons.
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Biometric locks are high-tech locks that address this weakness by providing 
some guarantee about the identity of the person seeking access to the computer 
system. A biometric lock uses biological information about the person seeking 
access to establish and verify user identity. Three kinds of biometric locks are: (1) 
fingerprint readers, (2) retina scanners, and (3) voice analyzers.
The fingerprint reader is the least expensive biometric lock. Such a device 
costs several hundred dollars. To gain access to a terminal or to enter the data 
center, a person places his or her fingers on a device that reads fingerprints and 
matches them to those stored in an access security file. Some fingerprint readers 
also are heat-sensitive, enabling them to detect whether the fingerprint being 
scanned is part of a warm body or just a latex mold.
Retina scanners are more expensive than fingerprint readers. The person 
attempting to gain access looks into a device resembling a pair of binoculars, 
mounted on a wall beside the door. A low-powered infrared beam scans the per­
son’s retina patterns, which —just like fingerprints — are unique. The retina 
patterns are then compared to those stored on file.
Voice-activated locks are the most expensive biometric lock. The person 
seeking access to the data center speaks into the device. The voice patterns are 
then matched to those stored in the access file.
Biometric locks are not foolproof, however. The retina scanner, for exam­
ple, falsely rejects potential entrants about 10 percent of the time; voice-activated 
locks can also reject people if they laugh or are hoarse due to a cold. Moreover, 
there is always the possibility that the voice is just a tape recording of the legiti­
mate person.
Another aspect of security concerns controlling remote access to a com­
puter network. Hardware devices can be used to act as intermediaries between 
people seeking remote access and the network. This issue is discussed in the sec­
tion on network security.
Password Security The major issue in the area of logical security involves limiting the access of 
authorized users to only those functions for which they are authorized. Passwords 
provide the primary line of defense in this area. Several measures can increase 
the effectiveness of passwords. Obviously, passwords must be secret, and it is 
important to stress that to all employees.
Passwords should always be at least six characters long. In addition, they 
should contain a mixture of numbers and letters, which is much more difficult to 
guess by trial and error. Passwords should also be changed frequently. Many sys­
tems can be designed to do this automatically, notifying a user that his or her 
current password is no longer valid and that a new one needs to be entered. The 
time period should seldom exceed 90 days, unless the access is limited to inquiry 
of nonsensitive data.
The system should also track recently used passwords and prevent employ­
ees from reusing old passwords for the next several 90-day periods. In addition, 
close variations of previous passwords should not be allowed. Multiple passwords 
can be used to provide different levels of access and capabilities. In a number 
of cases, a password based on the physical location of a machine can be used. 
For example, a terminal located in the factory may be denied access to the pay­
roll files.
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Disaster Recovery 
Planning
An environmental hazard (for example, fire, flood) may strike at any time. The 
danger may not even be a direct threat to the organization’s equipment, but may 
affect the communications networks that it uses. For example, a fire in a telephone- 
switching center knocked out the networks of many companies in the area.
Also, recent flooding and earthquakes are painful reminders that disasters 
occur. Therefore, thorough plans must be made for addressing such contingencies.
The proper selection and preparation of the location of the computers is an 
important factor in minimizing the chance of a significant outage. For example, 
computer equipment should not be stored in areas that are prone to flooding 
(for example, basements or other areas with water pipes). The placement and 
type of fire-fighting equipment in use in the room should also be considered.
Plans must also be made to provide for access to alternative or back-up sys­
tems in the event of a disaster. Several firms specialize in offering such services. 
The two most common alternatives are called hot sites and cold sites. In a hot 
site, a computer and all peripherals identical to the ones the organization cur­
rently uses are set up and ready to go at a moment’s notice.
Cold sites vary in scope; a number have the proper communications wiring 
and other supplies available. In other cold sites, there just may be an empty 
building which can be wired, equipment installed, or whatever. In the cold-site 
solution, a prespecified amount of time (for example, seven days) is allotted to 
obtain and set up a computer and the other equipment necessary. Obviously, a 
cold site is less expensive than a hot site. The choice of a hot or cold site should 
be based on the nature of the organization’s business and how long the applica­
tions can be down without significant consequences.
Organizations should prepare a disaster recovery plan that addresses all 
the issues to be considered in the event of a disaster. The plan should include the 
following:
■ Definition of when the plan goes into effect (after a 3-hour outage, for 
instance)
■ Steps to follow and individuals to be contacted
■ Critical applications and time frames
■ Listing of equipment and supplies needed
■ Critical phone numbers of employees, vendors, and so on
Backup Backup of information systems resources is essential. Backup involves more than 
just making copies of all data, however. The latest versions of all important pro­
grams and data files, including the operating system, must also be copied. 
Supplies of all necessary forms and documents are also needed. How often 
backup is done is a matter that management needs to address based on the risks 
of recreating lost data. At a minimum, all files should be backed up weekly. In 
many cases, changes are backed up daily. In other cases, given a low volume of 
changes, data files can be backed up every three to four days.
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Viruses Viruses are one of the newest causes of disaster within organizations and, out of 
all computers, microcomputers are the most susceptible. A virus is a program 
that is designed to disrupt or stop a computer system from functioning properly. 
Essentially, a virus contains instructions to copy itself onto a number of other files 
or programs of the organization. Often, a virus will then proceed by filling up all 
available space in memory with garbage. As the computer runs out of memory to 
run normal programs, the system slows down or may even come to a halt.
The best defense against viruses involves careful control over the introduc­
tion of new software. Viruses most often are introduced as part of software that is 
free or downloaded from public bulletin boards; games and desktop accessories 
are prime carriers. Policies need to be established and enforced that prohibit 
personnel from loading any software onto a system without first running it 
through a careful check by the person in charge of information systems security. 
There are programs, called vaccines, that can detect and purge viruses.
When using a computer program that was copied from an outside source, it 
is possible for the copied code to contain a virus that will destroy the operating 
system’s software, application software, data files, or databases. (There are various 
methods of protection.) Connection to a network also gives a virus access to an 
organization’s entire system. A virus can be latent and can reside in a system for a 
period of time. It may be activated by the number of times certain lines of pro­
gram code are processed, by a specific date, or by other events.
The major controls against unintentional or intentional destruction or 
modification are the various security software packages and managerial aware­
ness of the importance of backing up the operating system software and the 
utilities on a periodic basis. The major controls against contamination by virus of 
programs or data are to use only original copies of purchased software, avoid the 
use of programs copied from public bulletin boards, and use virus detection soft­
ware, like Norton AntiVirus.
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Management Issues
Summary of Issues 
and Background
The management issues that relate to information security are organization, 
planning, control, and evaluation. An organizational structure amenable to 
developing and implementing the security plan must be developed. Management 
must formulate security policies and strategies for carrying out these policies. 
Strategic and tactical plans must be constructed together with the related proce­
dures. These plans must be tested and evaluated.
Management is responsible for protecting the company’s vital information 
and resources. With the amount of information contained in computer systems, 
access to these systems should be an important concern of management. The 
increased complexity that computers permit makes systems more difficult 
to understand and protect. However, the fundamental principles of effective 
management and administration apply. A number of issues that need to be 
addressed in order to achieve effective security management are discussed in the 
following sections.
Organizational
Structure
A fundamental issue in managing security is to use the organizational structure 
to implement this function. Various approaches to organizational structuring of 
the computer security units of companies have been recommended. Recent stud­
ies indicate that most computer security units are now supervised by line 
managers in the information systems department. A number of authorities con­
tend that security responsibilities should be decentralized to functional areas that 
create and maintain information. Other recommendations call for a highly 
placed and independent corporate security department. Either method of 
administering security is effective with appropriate management support.
The security group must be positioned within the organization so that it 
commands enough influence to perform its job; management must be aware and 
attentive to the importance of security. The group’s responsibilities should be 
clarified in explicit documentation, and company personnel must be required to 
read and understand the security manual.
Security Policies 
and Strategy
One of the first steps in developing an information security program is for a com­
pany to formulate policies promoting the protection of data and citing the 
responsibility of all users in this area. Security strategy is based on these policies 
and should include guidelines for securing data processing, defining proper 
naming conventions, using passwords responsibly, and inspecting reports gener­
ated on attempted security violations.
A major element of security strategy is evaluating future security needs. A 
needs assessment should be conducted to determine the monetary value of the 
company’s data, how much data the company can afford to lose, the probability 
of loss, how much risk exposure the company is willing to accept, and the budget 
for security.
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Security Plan Planning consists of a general review, the definition of boundaries of effort, the 
partitioning of work, the identification of areas of emphasis, and the structuring 
of a specific plan.
A general review is made at a very high level of the entire system to develop 
an understanding of the issues involved. Next, systems boundaries must be estab­
lished that consider all relevant facets of the environment, including the 
administrative, physical, and technical areas. Using these boundaries, security 
evaluation responsibilities can be divided among administrative security, opera­
tions, contingency planning, data entry and output, the operating system, 
environmental controls, the change control and development methods, applica­
tion software controls, the database management system, and hardware.
It is imperative that emphasis be placed on those areas where the greatest 
potential loss might occur. This determination is based on risk analysis, previous 
reports of problems, and management judgment.
The information obtained in the planning process becomes the basis for the 
company’s strategy in implementing and administrating a security program for 
the company. One approach to developing a strategic security plan is to include 
the following elements: assessment of risk, responsiveness to new information 
needs, personnel, return on investment, services to be provided, and effective and 
efficient use of capacity. The accompanying tactical plan would include systems 
planning, project planning, data planning, and application planning.
Testing the
Security Plan
A basic management action which must be undertaken is that of testing the effec­
tiveness of the security plan. Most organizations have established comprehensive 
guidelines, policies, standards, and procedures, as well as identified areas of 
responsibility for computer security. Nevertheless, a number have neither tested 
their plans nor do they evaluate their security procedures on regular intervals. 
More is needed than simply to prepare plans, policies, and procedures. The 
administration or management of the security function is critical to an effective 
computer security program. Some of the testing can be done by internal or exter­
nal auditors.
Risk Assessment A fundamental element in developing a strategic security plan is to determine 
related risk. The major objective of risk assessment is to comprehend the security 
problems by identifying security risks, determining their magnitude, and identify­
ing areas that need safeguards. Data need to be classified according to risk. If this 
investigation is performed at the beginning of the system’s life cycle, it can 
become the basis for system security requirements; if performed later in the 
cycle, it can be a tool in evaluating security. Such analysis is generally conducted 
under the guidance of individuals directly involved with the system being studied. 
Risks can be classified into several categories, as follows:
■ Disclosure of information
■ Corruption of data or programs
■ Destruction of physical assets or data
■ Unavailability of service
■ Removal of hardware or information
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Evaluating Security 
Posture
Evaluation consists of the two major activities of basic evaluation and detailed 
evaluation. These activities are discussed in the following sections.
Basic Evaluation
Basic evaluation is directed primarily to the overall security posture of the organi­
zation. It consists of the following four elements.
1. Requirements evaluation is conducted to ascertain that security require­
ments are well defined. Documentation of the company’s requirements 
can be compared with external requirements, including user groups or 
government.
2. Functional evaluation is conducted to ascertain that specific functions sat­
isfy security requirements. Functions evaluated include authentication, 
authorization, monitoring, security management, and security labeling.
3. Control evaluation ascertains that the functions contained in a document 
or noted in an interview have indeed been implemented. The imple­
mentation of physical and administrative controls can be verified by 
visual inspection. Testing is generally required for internal computer 
controls.
4. Methodology review represents the analysis of the methodology used in 
developing the system. Such a review enables management to substanti­
ate their previous findings and develop confidence in the system. If such 
a review indicates that reliance cannot be placed on the implementa­
tion, a detailed evaluation must be made to identify specific problems.
Detailed Evaluation
Detailed evaluation is undertaken if basic evaluation does not provide the desired 
degree of satisfaction. In detailed evaluation, additional evidence is sought to 
provide the reviewer with increased confidence. Tests are undertaken to evaluate 
the following areas: functional operation, performance, penetration resistance, 
and detailed focusing. Functional operation basically assesses protection against 
human error. A significant element in detailed evaluation is the ability of various 
security safeguards to resist penetration.
Evaluation is a continuing process. Changes in a system or its security envi­
ronment must be reviewed for their impact on security. If new or modified 
procedures or processes are required, they must be developed and implemented. 
Further, the impact of such changes on existing controls must be studied and 
required modifications or eliminations must be made.
Note: See the previous discussion, “Disaster Recovery Planning,” page 19. 
Disaster recovery, though not solely the responsibility of security management, is 
a closely related function and should be taken into account.
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Introduction It is likely that no practitioner or client can ignore potential threats to infor­
mation security. Information is arguably the most valuable resource of 
organizations. Moreover, the computer technology entrusted with this informa­
tion is too pervasive for anyone to overlook.
This report has discussed the various elements of information security in 
relation to audit implications, MAS opportunities, client service delivery, and 
general awareness. This section continues that approach with a brief review of 
those sections relative to their implications on the practitioner. The term 
practitioner is broadly defined. Thus, sole practitioners, small practice units, large 
practice units, industry professionals, government professionals, other nonprofit 
professionals, and consultants are included. As we review these sections, we will 
focus on issues relative to the office (practice management) and to service provi­
sion (audit, consulting, and taxes). Finally, we will close with comments on the 
skills required and approaches to getting started.
Issues in the Office Regardless of how broadly or narrowly the practitioner is defined, the issue of 
information security remains central to economic success. The four general 
threats mentioned in the introductory chapter are relevant to the practitioner’s 
office as well as to clients’ offices.
Practice management in an increasingly complex and competitive world 
requires good information, much of which is — and must be kept — confidential 
because clients face the same competitive environment. Practitioners cannot 
afford to be the cobbler’s barefoot children on this issue. The first overall danger 
is that confidential information may be disclosed to unauthorized individuals. 
This possibility is daunting, because little if any collusion is necessary to effect an 
unauthorized disclosure. Nevertheless, another possibility is even worse: Massive 
unauthorized disclosure may be carried out with the help of technology. This 
threat hinges on the fact that the practitioner may not even be aware of the theft 
of the information until too late. An incredible amount of critical information 
may be stolen with the help of storage devices and/or network access.
How will you respond to a client or to management if there is an unautho­
rized disclosure of proprietary information, a tax return, a strategy analysis, or 
some other similar information? What happens if someone takes the client 
list? The bottom line is that your worst fears are made possible by information 
technology; the flip side of information technology is its potential as a competi­
tive weapon.
The second threat is the unauthorized modification of information. The 
availability and use of databases, networks, laptops, and the general ease of 
accessing computer systems have led to widespread difficulties in unauthorized 
modification. For example, suppose someone in the office can access and change 
the payroll system to their advantage and change it back after the sequence is 
run. The increase in productivity per person has created a difficulty by reducing 
the segregation of duties. Now, one person can manage a fairly complex segment 
of an information systems operation. Thus, one person may have tremendous 
access to the entire system. In addition, as users become more technologically 
sophisticated, their ability to modify the system increases.
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The third general threat is the disruption of resource availability. From time 
to time, surveys have attempted to measure how long an organization might sur­
vive without its computer system. The results are frightening in that a number of 
organizations are thinking in terms of hours, or at most a few days. Without 
proper planning, practitioners face essentially the same possibilities for disaster. 
A number of practitioners may be providing information resource services to 
clients. If so, disruption must be an integral part of the risk assessment planning 
done by the firm and the client.
The fourth general threat is the misuse of information resources by autho­
rized users and unauthorized users. Clearly, misuse by unauthorized users is 
unacceptable. However, misuse by authorized users is more difficult to evaluate. 
For example, if the use of information sources is encouraged, it is reasonable to 
assume that a number of computer games will be played on the computers. Each 
firm must define misuse. This definition must include an explanation of how and 
to what extent use differs from misuse. Authorized users may, for instance, start 
an entrepreneurial venture by using the office computer system as their own. 
Another possibility is the risk to the practitioner of unauthorized software being 
used on the firm’s computers. Firms need to have a written policy that is commu­
nicated to employees. Careful monitoring of system usage and an occasional 
sampling of the files and software may be advisable.
The very real threats posed by information technology should be addressed 
by the management of the firm. The technical threats of information security are 
all carried out by people. Thus, in order to be able to correctly advise, audit, and 
counsel clients, the management must be up to date on how technology affects 
their own firms. In other words, practitioners themselves are a good illustration 
of the need for strong and effective information security.
Issues in
Providing Services
The issuance of AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 55, 
Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), made the self-evident official: The 
auditor should obtain an understanding of the client’s internal control as part of 
planning the audit. The role of information security is central to the control 
structure in many clients. Therefore, many audits need to include consideration 
of the adequacy of information security. Therefore, the auditor is confronted 
with the issue of senior management’s oversight of information security. Beyond 
oversight, the auditor must be cognizant of both the human and machine-based 
transaction authorization processes.
The pervasiveness of information systems and the need for systems develop­
ment and maintenance present the practitioner with a significant problem. The 
practitioner (whether an external or internal auditor) can provide valuable input 
in the development life cycle, but must remain independent. This fine line is crit­
ical to the success of the audit and the integrity of the auditor.
Although the practitioner races to maintain technical and professional com­
petence, technology and the issues of information security continue their rapid 
rate of change. Clients are moving to EDI to replace paper processing. Where 
will the audit trails of the future be located? In the information systems. The 
information security of EDI environments makes some of the other information 
systems’ security problems look simple. Information security issues can only 
increase in importance. The auditor has little choice but to increase his or her 
efforts in a concomitant manner.
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Knowledge and 
Skills Required
Information security does not call for vast amounts of technical skills although 
access to certain skills may be necessary. This does not mean that a practitioner 
can address information security without minimal professional knowledge. It 
does mean that a practitioner can gain the knowledge to successfully address 
information security with reasonable effort. Technical skills may be gained in a 
variety of ways. Numerous courses are available that pertain to the technology of 
information security.
People must remain the focus of efforts to address the information security 
problem. People — not technology — cause the problem. Technology does, how­
ever, provide the opportunity for misuse. Internally, employees can misuse the 
resources to which their positions provide access. Externally, the computer sys­
tem can be attacked.
Practitioners need to examine both the internal and external threats. The 
press coverage of external threats might lead one to believe that these are the 
predominant dangers. Yet, there are estimates that internal threats comprise 70 
to 90 percent of all losses attributable to breaches of information security. If 
these estimates are accurate, they make a strong case for tight internal controls 
and good management practices.
Such recommendations are similar to those that were appropriate in the 
past, but they carry even more weight today, given the growing importance of 
security and the unprecedented extent to which organizations are vulnerable to 
disgruntled employees. Thus, in information security, management style may be 
as important a variable as encryption controls.
The next key component in the above logic is that everyone is involved in 
information security. Every manager should have an understanding of the 
responsibility that he or she shares. If the statement about people is true, then 
every manager can positively affect the security plan of the organization by —
■ Gaining a general understanding of security in the assigned areas of his 
or her responsibility.
■ Assessing the weaknesses that pertain to the data and information for 
which he or she is responsible.
■ Providing an example to subordinates concerning security.
■ Managing employees so as to minimize the damage that may be inflicted 
by disgruntled employees.
By uncovering the facts about information security, the practitioner can pro­
vide client service to general management. A key element of this service is to 
focus on the value and risk analyses that the practitioner has done or can do. It is 
interesting that such analyses usually confirm the point made previously: The 
risks are internal, and their cause is people. The problems are not driven by tech­
nology, and the solution is good management. The practitioner who addresses 
information security should gain a competitive advantage.
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Access Control Software
This software is used to help prevent unauthorized access to data or system functions.
Database
This is a collection of related data that are stored together without unnecessary 
redundancy and serve multiple applications. The data are stored independently 
of the programs that use the data.
Database Administrator (DBA)
This is the manager of a database.
Database Management Systems (DBMS)
This software product provides controlled access to the physical database.
Decryption Program
This program restores information from encrypted form and usually requires a 
password to restore the information.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
This is the electronic exchange of business documents in a standard format.
Encryption Program
This program scrambles information in one or more files based on a key or 
password.
Information Security
These are the policies, procedures, and methods for assuring that access to infor­
mation systems resources (for example, data, software, and hardware) are 
restricted to authorized individuals and information systems resources are avail­
able on an ongoing basis to support the needs of the organization.
Local Area Network (LAN)
This is hardware and software used to transmit data among microcomputers, 
workstations, and other peripherals to meet the requirements for relatively short- 
distance communication.
Metropolitan Area Network (MAN)
This area network fills the gap between LANs and WANs and covers a range from 
1 to 40 miles.
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Operating System Software
This group of computer programs performs housekeeping functions in the sys­
tem. These functions include scheduling, initiating, terminating, reading, 
writing, communicating, logging, and allocating.
User Exits
This is a place in the operating system software where a user can modify the oper­
ating system and still maintain the integrity of the original operating system.
Utilities
This software performs common tasks used daily such as copying programs or 
data, deleting programs or data.
Virus
This computer code will destroy operating systems software, application software, 
data files, or databases.
Wide Area Network (WAN)
This phrase applies to area networks that tie together users who are separated 
widely geographically and often are linked using public telecommunication facili­
ties or leased lines.
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The Information Technology Section
IT Section Membership
The AICPA IT Section provides products and services which will allow you to 
keep pace with changes in technology and increase your competence in informa­
tion technology. It will also offer advice that will help you provide information 
technology services in a more professional — and profitable — manner. Annual 
membership dues are $100. Section benefits include —
■ Subscription to the IT Section’s quarterly newsletter, InfoTech Update, 
with essential information on new developments in the ever-changing 
world of technology.
■ Practice aids, technology bulletins, and research reports.
■ At least four issues of Technology Alert — one-page releases on up-to-the- 
minute topics.
■ Vendor discounts on selected products and publications.
■ Discounted registration to the annual Microcomputer Conference.
For more information on IT Section membership, please call Nancy Cohen at 
(212) 596-6010.
AICPA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PUBLICATIONS
IT Practice Aids Series 
CPA Firm Technology Planning Guide 
Image Processing and Optical Character Recognition — 
How They Work and How To Implement Them 
Computer Disaster Recovery Planning Guide 
Microcomputer Security
Information Security
IT Technology Bulletins Series 
Memory Management 
Executive Information Systems
Client/Server Computing and Cooperative Processing 
IT Research Reports Series
Audit and Security Issues With Expert Systems
Ready to join now? Send the completed application 
form to Nancy Cohen—Information Technology 
American Institute of CPAs 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Membership application form
AICPA INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
MEMBERSHIP SECTION
Please enroll me as a member in the AICPA Information Technology 
Membership Section through July 31.1 understand that the 
$100.00* dues fee covers all membership benefits.
Firm
Address
City State Zip
□ Payment enclosed □ Bill me
Member Number
Signature Business Telephone
CODE — PA: IS
*Dues will be prorated quarterly.
This form may be photocopied.
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